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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court's decision filed June 9, 1987 dealt strictly 
with the history of the common law right of a husband to consor-
tium and Appellant's argument that the language of Section 30-2-4 
is ambiguous; that it had been erroneously construed or inter-
preted in earlier decisions and the interpretation did not follow 
basic statutory construction principles. 
However, the central thrust of Appellant's argument that 
the previous interpretations of Section 30-2-4- were incorrect and 
that the statute was and is unconstitutional was not addressed nor 
determined by the Court's opinion. 
Appellant urges the Court to reconsider its decision and 
in particular to make a determination of the important constitu-
tional issues in light of three specific unanimous decisions by 
the Court in Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah, 1984), Johnston 
v. Stoker, 685 P.2d 539 (Utah, 1984) and Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 
717 P.2d 670 (Utah, 1985). 
Appellant hopes that each member of the Court will con-
sider the long range problems of not limiting legislature's power 
to modify common law rights and realize it is the Court, not the 
legislature, who should and must adapt, recognize, refine and 
maintain the common law. Since a claim for the loss of consortium 
has always been a common law right and it has only been limited 
here by Court interpretations, it is up to the Court to recognize 
that the loss of consortium is part of the common law today. 
Appellant is not asking the Court to expand the common law but to 
recognize that today the common law of Utah and the United States 
includes the loss of consortium, the protection of the sanctity of 
the marital relationship for both husband and wife. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT IN ITS OPINION FAILED TO ADDRESS 
OR DECIDE APPELLANT ARGUMENTS AS TO THE 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 30-2-4 AS 
INTERPRETED. 
When this court chose to follow the past interpretation 
given to the language of Section 30-2-4 it did not address the 
constitutionality of the elimination of valid a recognized common 
law right to loss of consortium or the inequality it creates under 
these interpretations, which both violate provisions of the Utah 
State Constitution. 
A. Section 30-2-4 as interpreted is an unconstitu-
tional elimination of a valid recognized common law right in vio-
lation of Article 1 Section 11 and Article 1 Section 7 of the 
Utah State Constitution, 
1. The loss of consortium in the years pre-1898 
was a valid recognized common law right in Utah. 
The husband's right to recover for the loss of consor-
tium which he suffered when his wife was injured was universally 
recognized. Restatement, Torts, Section 693: "Husband's Right to 
Damages for Loss of Consortium," 21 ALR 1519, supplemented 133 
ALR 1157. 
This Court, in Black v. United States, 263 F. Supp 470 
(D. Utah, 1967), Ellis v. Hathaway, 493 P.2d. 986 (Utah, 1972), 
Tjas v. Procter, 591 P.2d 986 (Utah, 1978) and the written opin-
ion in this case, filed June 9, 1987, has consistantly held that 
in the years pre-1898 the right to loss of consortium existed in 
Utah. 
2. Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah State Constitu-
tion must be read as imposing limitations on legislative power for 
the benefit of those persons who are injured in their persons, pro 
perty or reputations. 
One of the constitutional restraints on a legislature's 
power to totally eliminate a common law right is found in Article 
1, Section 11 of the Utah State Constitution which reads in perti-
nent part, as follows: 
All Courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person, pro-
perty or reputation, shall have remedy by due 
course of law, which shall be administered with-
out denial or unnecessary delay. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized this important 
legislative restraint for many years. In the case of Brown v. 
Wightman, 151 P. 366 (Utah, 1915), the Court commented on Article 
1, Section 11 by stating: 
The Courts have, however, always con-
sidered and treated these provisions not as 
creating new rights or as giving new remedies, 
where none otherwise are given, but as placing a 
limitation upon the legislature to prevent that 
branch of the state government from closing the 
doors of the courts against any person who has a 
legal right which is enforceable in accordance 
with some known remedy. (151 P at 366-7) 
See also Lewis v. Merchants Protective Association, 235 P 880, 884 
(Utah, 1925), Horn v. Shaffer, 235 P 555, 558 (Utah, 1915) and 
Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah, 1980). 
The recent leading opinion involving Article 1, Section 
11 was decided by this Court unanimously (4-0) in December 1985, 
in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah, 1985). In 
that case, the Court, after careful analysis determined that: 
It is, in fact, one of the most important 
functions of the legislature to change and 
modify the law that governs relations between 
individuals as society evolves and conditions 
require. However, once a cause of action under 
a particular rule of law accrues to a person by 
virtue of an injury to his rights, that person's 
interest in the cause of action and the law 
which is the basis for a legal action becomes 
vested, and a legislative repeal of the law 
cannot constitutionally divest the injured per-
son of the right to litigate the cause of action 
to a judgment. (717 P.2d at 676) 
The Court held that since Article 1, Section 11 was a 
substantial limitation on the legislature's power and since the 
Product Liability Statute of Limitations did not meet the require-
ments of that constitutional provision, the statute was unconsti-
tutional. 
Many other states have used similar constitutional provi-
sion to strike down their guest statutes, statutes of repose in 
Product Liability field and other attempts by legislatures to 
abolish common law rights. See Point II A. of Appellant's Origi-
nal Brief. 
3. Section 30-2-4 as interpreted is an uncon-
stitutional elimination of the common law right to a claim for 
loss of consortium as it violates Article 1, Section 11 of the 
Utah State Constitution. 
In Berry, Supra the Court held that: 
... Section 11 of the Declaration of Rights 
and the prerogative of the legislature are 
properly accomodated by applying a two-part 
analysis. (717 P.2d at 609) 
We will set forth the facts of this case in reference to that two-
part analysis. 
a. Section 30-2-4 as interpreted does not 
satisfy Article lf Section 11 because by the elimination of common 
law right it did not provide to the injured person an effective and 
reasonable alternative remedy by due course of law for vindication 
of that right. 
In this case it is clear that the legislative intent 
behind the passing of the Married Woman's Act was to remove the 
restrictions placed on married women/ known as coverture, thus 
allowing a married woman to sue, to contract, and own property. 
By interpretation the Court has determined that Section 
30-2-4 also removed the right of a husband to sue for the loss of 
consortium when his wife was injured. 
However, Section 30-2-4 does not even attempt to estab-
lish any alternative to the taking away of this common law right. 
Thus, Section 30-2-4 must fail the first of the two part 
test in that it does not even attempt to set up any effective 
alternative remedy. 
If the Act took away the husband's right to sue for his 
wife's own injuries and gave her the right, thus taking away of a 
common law right would be acceptable because it substitutes the 
right of a married woman to sue for her own injuries herself. 
Please refer to Part I of Appellant's Reply Brief. 
b. Section 30-2-4 does not satisfy Arti-
cle 1, Section 11 because there is not a clear social or economic 
evil to be eliminated and the elimination of the existing legal 
remedy (loss of corsortium) is an arbitrary and unreasonable means 
for achieving the objective. 
The purpose of Married Women's Act was to remove the 
legal disabilities of coverture and to allow married women to have 
the same legal rights to sue, contract and own property as married 
man and singles. This is a very noble purpose which was widely 
recognized at that time. 
However, the elimination of an existing legal right of a 
husband to sue for loss of consortium was not necessary to achiev-
ing the purpose of the statute. The purpose of the Act was to 
enable a married woman to bring her own suits, not to remove a 
common law right from her husband to loss of consortium. 
Thus the removal from the husband of the right to loss of 
consortium is an illogical arbitrary means for achieving the 
purpose of the statute. 
B. Section 30-2-4 as interpreted is unconstitutional 
under Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah State Constitution because 
it treats persons similarly situated unequally. 
1. Article 1, Section 24 places significant limitations 
on the power of the legislature to enact laws. 
Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution reads in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation. 
It is clear that said section and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution 
place additional restrictions on governmental exercise of author-
ity in passing legislation. 
This Court in the recent case of Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 
661 (Utah, 1984) stated in the unanimous (4-0) opinion concerning 
these restrictions: 
Basic principles of equal protection of 
the law are inherent in the very concept of 
justice and are a necessary attribute of a just 
society. (693 P.2d at 670) 
The Court in Malan, Supra, also stated concerning Article 
1, Section 24 and the 14th Amendment: 
Although their language is dissimilar, 
these provisions embody the same general princi-
ple: persons similarly situated should be 
treated similarly, and persons in different 
circumstances should not be treated as if their 
circumstances were the same. (693 P.2d at 669) 
Justice Robert Jackson in Railway Express Agency, Inc., 
v. New York , 336 U.S. 106 at 112-113 explained: 
This equality is not merely abstract jus-
tice. The framers of the Constitution knew, and 
we should not forget today, that there is no 
more effective practical guarantee against arbi-
trary and unreasonable government than to 
require that the principles of law which offi-
cials would impose upon a minority must be 
imposed generally . . . 
If the precept of equal protection of the 
laws is not honored, arbitrariness and oppres-
sion will prevail. Courts can take no better 
measure to assure that laws will be just that to 
require that its laws be equal in protection. 
2. Section 30-2-4 fails to meet equal protection 
standards because it treats persons equally situated differently 
and the classifications established do not provide a reasonable 
basis for promoting the objectives of the statute. 
The language of Section 30-2-4 as interpreted creates 
inequality in the law for pesons similarly situated. 
There are at least five ways that a third parties1 con-
duct can so totally injure the sanctity of the marital relation-
ship that the other spouse loses all love, society, companionship, 
advice, counsel and conjugal fellowship of ones marital partner. 
These are listed below: 
1. intentionally causing the death of one's spouse 
2. negligently causing the death of one's spouse 
3. intentionally allienating the affection of a spouse 
4. intentionally causing a debilitating injury to 
one's spouse 
5. negligently causing a debilitating injury to one's 
spouse. 
In each of these examples the person can lose the total 
love, affection and conjugal interests of their injured spouse. 
Each feels the loss just as horribly as the other. While the 
person whose spouse is dead may recover compensation, the person 
whose spouse has lived after a negligently caused debilitating 
injury allowing no real companionship, love or society cannot 
recover. 
How can the law say to Sherrie Hackford, whose role 
instead of wife and companion has turned to babysitter and life-
long nurse to care for Greg that she cannot recover, when her 
neighbor whose husband's life after a negligently caused injury 
was taken instantly can recover for that loss, which is perhaps 
not as great a loss as Sherrie's? 
How can the law say to Mrs. X that because a burglar who 
shot and totally disabled her husband, while he attempted a res-
cue, she cannot recover anything, even though the act was inten-
tional, when her neighbor, Mrs. Y, can be compensated when a 
teenage boy missed a stop sign and killed Mr. Y. Should the law, 
if it is to treat these persons similarly situated, allow compen-
sation equally to all for their loss? 
However# by virtue of the Courts present interpretation 
of Utah Statutes and law, the plaintiff, in examples 1, 2 and 3 
could bring a cause of action against the person intentionally or 
negligently causing the spouse's death, injury or alienation. 
Surely the marital interest of the injured wife in examples 4 and 
5 has been hurt and damaged just the same as those in examples 1, 
2 and 3, if not worse. 
Additionally, the classifications established by Section 
30-2-4 do not meet any rational basis test in meeting the objec-
tives of the statute. The objective of the Married Woman's Act to 
remove the disabilities of coverture had no relation to the uncon-
stitutional distinctions which would remove the husband's right to 
compensation for negligently created loss of consortium of a 
living wife, yet allowing such claims in examples 1, 2 and 3 
above. 
II. THE COURT IN ITS OPINION FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT 
SINCE THE RIGHT TO LOSS OF CONSORTIUM IS A COMMON LAW RIGHT, THE 
COURT, NOT THE LEGISLATURE, MUST DETERMINE ITS AVAILABILITY AND 
SCOPE. 
To contend that we should leave the decision as to whet-
her Utah recognizes the loss of consortium to the legislature "is 
a request that Courts of law abdicate their responsibility for the 
upkeep of the common law. That upkeep it needs continuously, as 
this case demonstrates." Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corpora-
tion, 525 P.2d 667, 676 (California, 1984). 
A. The common law is the fabric of our society and by 
necessity it must change and adapt to the needs of the community 
it serves. 
Thomas Jefferson, one of our country's greatest scholars 
and architects of our country's legal system, stated: 
Laws and institutions must go hand in hand with 
the progress of the human mind. As that becomes 
more developed, more enlightened, as new dis-
coveries are made, new truths disclosed, and 
manners and opinions change with the change of 
circumstances, institutions must advance also, 
and keep pace with the times. (Jefferson, let-
ter to Samuel Kercheval July 12, 1816) 
The United States Supreme Court in the case of Hurtado 
v. California, (1884) 110 U.S. 516, 530 stated: 
This flexibility and capacity for growth and 
adaptation is the peculiar boast and excellance 
of the common law (110 U.S. at 530). 
However, this vitality can flourish only so long as the 
Courts remain alert to their obligation and opportunity to inter-
pret and modify the common law when reason and equity demand it. 
As conditions, beliefs and needs of society change, so is change 
and adeptation of sound common law principles and rights. 
In Rodriguez v. Bethleham Steel Corporation, supra, the 
California Supreme Court states: 
The judicial responsibility to which we 
referred in Pierce arises from the role of the 
courts in a common law system. In California as 
in other jurisdictions of Anglo-American heri-
tage, the common law "is not a codification of 
exact or inflexible rules for human conduct, for 
the redress of injuries, or for protection 
against wrongs, but is rather the embodiment of 
broad and comprehensive unwritten principles, 
inspired by natural reason and an innate sense 
of justice, and adopted by common consent for 
the regulation and government of the affairs of 
men". 
B. The common laws recognition of the protected marital 
relationship has been longstanding and has adapted to meet needs 
of today's society in the concept that marriage is a unique part-
nership wherein both partners have a protected interest. 
It is agreed that early common law developed a protected 
right of a husband in the loss of services of his wife. Later 
that right developed into the right of the husband to the loss of 
the companionship, love and conjugal fellowship of his wife. 
Then as married women attained the right to sue, own 
property and contract in their own names, Courts have adapted the 
right of a husband to loss of consortium to include a right by 
both spouses. 
In place of the old rule which granted the right to loss 
of services only to the husband, a new common law rule has arisen, 
recognizes a valid important protected interest that both spouse 
have in the marital partnership and which allows each spouse the 
right to recover for loss of consortium caused by negligent injury 
to the other spouse. 
In Gates v. Foley, 247 So.2d 40 (Fla., 1971) the Florida 
Supreme Court held: 
So it is that the unity concept of marriage has 
in a large part given way to the partner concept 
whereby a married woman stands as an equal to 
her husband in the eyes of the law. By giving 
the wife a separate equal existence, the law 
created a new interest which should not be left 
unprotected by the Courts. (247 So.2d at 44) 
Now in 47 states, District of Columbia, United States 
Supreme Court (Maritime Law), and Virgin Islands the common law 
has progressed and adapted itself to the needs of a changing 
society. "The law cannot and is not static. It must keep pace 
with changes in our society, for the doctrine of stare decis is 
not an iron mold which can never be changed." Gates v. Foley, 
247 So.2d 40, 43 (Fla, 1971). 
C. This Court should recognize the existing common law 
of the 47 States and of the United States regarding the unique 
nature of the marital relationship and allow both partners to 
bring a cause of action if one is injured. 
Many difficult decisions come to the Supreme Court but 
perhaps none is so difficult as how to deal with older precedent 
and the doctrine of stare decis. In fact, all states which now 
recognize the right to loss of consortium had to deal with the 
early version of the common law which only allowed the right to the 
husband. In Appendix "A" attached, is a list of at least twenty-
six states which had to review older precedent to finally adopt 
the right to loss of consortium to both husband and wife. 
However difficult, the law must adapt and change or if 
not, it becomes static and outdated. The pathway to change and 
adaption is not always easy. When the Supreme Court of California 
faced this same issue it referred to the landmark case of Dillon v. 
Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (California, 1968) wherein the Court was faced 
with earlier precedent and stated: 
"That the courts should allow recovery" to a 
wife for losses she personally suffers by reason 
of negligent injury to her husband "would appear 
to be a compelling proposition." But the path-
way to justice is not always smooth. Here, as 
in Dillon, the obstacle is a prior decision of 
this court; and as in Dillon, the responsibility 
for removing that obstacle, if it should be 
done, rests squarely upon us. (525 P.2d at 671) 
The Supreme Court of California in Rodriguez v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp., supra, at page 678 quoted Montgomery v. Stephen, 
101 NW.2d 227, (1960) when it faced the problem of earlier 
precedent: 
Were we to rule upon prededent alone, were 
stability the only reason for our being, we 
would have no trouble with this case. We would 
simply tell the woman to begone, and to take her 
shattered husband with her, that we need no 
longer be affronted by a sight so repulsive. In 
so doing we would have vast support from the 
dusty books. But dust from the decision would 
remain in our mouths through the years ahead, a 
reproach to law and conscience alike. Our oath 
is to do justice, not to perpetrate error. The 
Court rejected the precedents denying recovery 
for loss of consortium as "out of harmony with 
the conditions of modern society. They do 
violence to our convictions and our principles. 
We reject their applicability. The reasons for 
the old rule no longer obtaining, the rule falls 
with it. The obstacles to the wife's action 
were judge-invented and they are herewith judge-
destroyed". (525 P.2d at 678) 
Our Utah Supreme Court has not been backward in 
overruling unsound precedent and adapting the common law to fit 
the needs of today's society. Our Court has acted properly in its 
role and should not be shackled with old notions of what the right 
to loss of consortium meant a centry ago. When we find that the 
common law or "judge-made law" is unjust or out of step with the 
times we should have no reluctance to change it. 
In Hahn v. Armco Steel, 601 P.2d 152 (Utah, 1979), this 
Court adopted strict liability in product liability actions in 
expansion or recognition of the developing common law. 
In Mulhern v. Ingersoll, 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah, 1980), this 
Court adopted pure comparitive negligence in product liability 
cases. 
In Leigh Furniture v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah, 1982), 
this Court recognized the tort of interference with prospective 
economic relations. 
The list of cases could go on and on because this Court 
has recognized the need to continually adapt and make changes to 
the common law. 
In Milligan v. Southeastern Elevator Company, 239 NE.2d 
897 (NY, 1968), the New York Court of Appeals faced the same issue 
and stated: 
No recitation of authority is needed to indicate 
that this Court has not been backward in over-
turning unsound precedent in the area of tort 
law . . . We act in the finest common law tradi-
tion when we adapt and alter decisional law to 
produce common sense justice . . . Legislative 
action there could, of course, be, but we abdi-
cate our own function, in a field peculiarly 
nonstatutory, when we refuse to reconsider an 
old and unsatisfactory court-made rule. (239 
NE.2d at 903). 
In Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361 (Wyoming, 1986), the 
most recent consortium opinion, the Wyoming Supreme Court Stated: 
We have not hesitated to overrule cases that 
were based on what was perceived to be the 
common law at the time the decisions were handed 
down. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, Wyoming, 666 
P.2d 1339 (1974). We are justified in 
overruling prior cases grounded on the common 
law if they stand for an unfair and improper 
rule or have outlived their usefullness, and do 
not meet changing needs. 
Without this Court recognizing the common law right to 
loss of consortium a valid relational interest will go without any 
protection and this Court will perpetuate unequality and 
injustice. Should the State of Utah deny that marriage creates a 
viable protectable interest? Doesn't our society living here in Utah 
believe that the marriage relationship should be protected from 
outside injury? At common law, the answer to these questions was 
a resounding yes. Today a marriage needs this protection more than 
ever. 
This Court should follow the near unanimous adoption of 
this view, not because we should jump on a band wagon, but because 
the other decisions are well reasoned decisions of other states 
and have recognized that the marital interest should be protected 
and this is what fits the needs of our present society. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant urges the Court to reconsider its opinion as to 
the appropriate interpretation of Section 30-2-4 and in particular 
hold that its present interpretation is a unconstitutional elimina-
tion of a valid common law right and creates an unconstitutional 
inequality in its treatment of persons similarly situated. 
Appellant also urges the Court to exercise its role as the 
common law requires and elevate the law of Utah to the recognition 
of the vital common law right of both husband and wife to compensatic 
for injuries to the sanctity of the marital relationship. 
Appellant thanks the Court for its time and consideration 
of this Petition. 
DATED this (p day of July, 1987. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C RICHARD HENRIKSEN, JR. £/ 
Of HENRIKSEN, HENRIKSEN & CALL, P.C. 
Attorney for Appellant, 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 521-4145 
APPENDIX "A" 
ALABAMA - Swartz v. United States Steet Corp, 293 Ala. 439, 304 
So.2d 881 (1974) overruling Smith v. United Construction 
Workers, 122 So.2d 153 (I960") 
ARIZONA - Glendale v. Bradshaw, 108 Ariz. 582, 503 P.2d 803 (1972) 
overruling Jeune v. Del E. Webb Construction Co., 77 Ariz. 
226, 269 P.2d 723 (1954) . 
ARKANSAS - Missouri Pacific Transportation Company v. Miller, 227 
Ark. 351, 229 S.W.2d 41 (1957) overruling Federal Court 
holding in Jordan v. States Marine Corp., 257 P.2d 232 
(CA. 9, 1958X 
CALIFORNIA - Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 328 P.2d 449 12 
Cal. 3d 382, 115 Ca. Rptr. 765 525 P.2d 669 (1974) over-
ruling Deshotel v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 50 
Cal.2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958). ~ . 
CONNECTICUT - Hopson v. St. Mary's Hospital, 176 Conn. 485, 408 
A.2d 260 (1979) overruling Lockwood v. Wilson H. Lee Com-
pany, 128 A.2d 330 (1956). 
DELAWARE - Yonner v. Adams, 53 Del. 229, 167 A.2d 717 (1961), 
overruling Sofolewski v. German, 32 Del. 540, 127 A. 49. 
FLORIDA - Gates v. Foley, 247 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1971), overruling 
Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So.2d 420 (Fla., 1952). 
GEORGIA - Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga. App. 
519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953) overruling Gle"nn v. Western U. 
Tel. Company, 1 Ga.App. 821, 58 S.E.83. 
ILLINOIS - Dini y. Naiditch, 20 111.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960) 
overruling Patelski v. Snyder, 179 I11.App 24. 
INDIANNA - Troue v. Marker, 253 Ind. 284, 252 N.E.2d 800 (1969), 
overruling, among others, Miller v. Sparks, 136 Ind. App. 
148, 189 N.E.2d 720 (1963). 
KENTUCKY - Stat. Ann. - Civil Code art. S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1970) 
overruling Baird v. Cincinati New Orleans & T.P.R. Co., 
(Ky., 1963). 
MARYLAND - Deems v. Western Maryland R. Co., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 
514 (1967), overruling, among others, Nicholson v. 
Blanchette, 210 A.2d 732 (1965), supp. op. 213 A.2d 71. 
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MASSACHUSETTS - Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 
(1973), overruling, among others, Lombardo v. D.F. 
Frangioso & Co., Ins. 269 NE.2d 836 (1971). 
MICHIGAN - Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227, 
overruling, among others, Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods Co., 
151 N.W.2d 724. 
MINNESOTA - Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 
N.W.2d 865 (1969), overruling Eschenback v. Benjamin, 263 
154 (1935). 
MISSOURI - Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 
1963), overruling, among others, Bernhardt v. Perry, 208 
S.W. 462. 
NEW JERSEY - Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp., 46 N.J. 82 215 
A. 2d 1 (1965), overruling, among others, Larocca v. 
American Claim & Cable Co., 92 A.2d 811, affid 97 A.2d 
680 (1952). 
NEW YORK - Millington v. South-Eastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 
498, 293 N.Y. S.2d 305, 239 N.E.2d 897 (1968), 
overruling, among many others, Heller v. Spyrido, 235 
N.Y. S.2d 168 (1962) . 
NORTH CAROLINA - Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hospital, 266 
S.E.2d 818 (N.C. 1980), overruling, among other 
conflicting cases, Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 32 
S.E.2d 611 (1945). 
OHIO - Clouston v. Remlinger-Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc., 22 Ohio 
St.2d 65, 258 N.E.2d 230 (1970) is the lead case; 
however, Leffler v. Wiley, 239 N.E.2d 235 (Ohio App. 
1968) refused to follow an earlier Ohio Supreme Court 
case, Smith v. Nicholes Bid. Co., 112 N.E. 204 (1915). 
PENNSYLVANIA - Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d (1974), 
overruling Newberg v. Bobowicz, 162 A.2d 662 (1960) due 
to passage of state ERA. 
TEXAS - Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1978), 
overruling Baldwin v. State, 215 A.2d 492 (1965). 
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APPENDIX B 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GREG HACKFORD, 
Plaintiff, 
SHERRIE HACKFORD, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation, and 
WESTERN PETROLEUM, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendants-Respondants 
and DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 20208 
Counsel for the Appellant hereby certifies that the 
Petition for Rehearing presented herein is made in good faith and 
is not for the purposes of any delay. 
DATED this (? day of July, 1987. 
CV RTCHARD HjENRIKSEN, 
of HENRIKSEN, HENRIKSEN" & CALL, P.C, 
Attorney for Appellant 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 521-4145 
